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Abstract 
In this study we try to explain the inclusion of banks in the WDCI list pro-
posed by Bloomberg. This list collects a group of more than 100 banking in-
stitutions which, during the crisis, suffered losses. We explain the probability 
of being part of the list (to suffer severe or highly severe losses) by their 
structure and performance. These aspects are represented by 4 variables: 
ROA, tier1 ratio, number of employees and total assets, referred to the two 
years preceding the crisis, of a larger sample of more than 400 banks com-
prehending the banks in and outside the list. By considering the heterogeneity 
among the banks of the list, an explanation of the probability of highly sever 
losses is offered by considering the previous variables with the addition of in-
terbanking assets. By using a probit model we find a confirmation of the new 
rules, inspired by the Basel 3 Accord and by the Financial Stability Board, 
requiring a solid patrimonial structure, in particular for the “too big to fail” 
financial institutions, accompanied by a medium return in order to assure a 
low probability to suffer losses.  
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Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis caused unprecedented losses with its shock, which was apparent only into 
the crisis. The bank sector was particularly menaced with large write-downs on risky mortgage related 
positions. Infact since the beginning of the financial crisis (second quarter of 2007) to the spring of 
2011, worldwide banks firms credit losses and write downs were $1.5 trillion. A large heterogeneity 
in losses distribution can be observed (Tab.1 and Tab.2) with a primacy of North America in the 
worldwide context and of UK banks in Europe. This fact seems to claim a certain role for cultural fac-
tors in affecting banking strategies and vulnerability. 
 
Table 1. Write downs and Credit losses by Continents (Q2 2007-May 2011)  
 Losses ($ billions) Number of banks 
North America 801,1 34 
Europe° 657,2 60 
Asia 41,6 11 
Worldwide°° 1501,9 107 
Source: Bloomberg WDCI.  
Notes: ° Europe includes the following countries banks: UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway. Worldwide°° includes also 
Island and Israel 
 
Table 2. Credit losses and Write downs inside Europe (Q2 2007-May 2011) 
 Losses ($ billions ) Number of banks 
UK 211,2 9 
Germany 115 16 
Switzerland 82 2 
France 62,4 5 
Belgium-the Netherlands 57,2 7 
Spain 39,4 3 
Italy* 37,5 4 
Ireland 24,2 3 
Denmark 10,6 3 
Greece 9,3 4 
Austria 5,1 2 
Norway 2,8 1 
Sweden 0,5 1 
Europe 657,2 60 
Source: Bloomberg WDCI. 
Notes: *Italy includes HVB.  
 
All this uncovers the limits of the bank provisioning process in order to cope with worse-than-
expected economic conditions, and raises concerns about bank capitalization, especially among the 
largest institutions. The individual prudent action of all firms had the unintentional effect of creat-
ing systemic problems. Infact banks manage their leverage in a procyclical manner so that it de-
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creases during boom period while it increases during recession, because of the use of collateralized 
borrowing and lending (D’Hulster, 2009). This pushed for proposals for countercyclical capital re-
quirements and loan loss provisions that would be higher in good times and lower in bad times. 
Capital is infact a safeguard against uncertainty as testified by the stress test for adverse economic 
and financial market conditions, applied to the 19 largest bank holding companies in the spring of 
2009 (see Board of Governors 2009). As well-capitalized banks face lower costs of going bankrupt 
and of suffering losses, we try to look for  the main factors of losses by analyzing the structure of the 
banks who suffered more. 
 
1. Banks differences in losses 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 543 banking institutions: 44 banks with write-downs and credit 
losses from the onset of the Great Crisis (the second quarter 2007) to May 2011, registered in a list 
published by Bloomberg (WDCI) 1 and the others from Bloomberg database. 
The sample so structured has a worldwide coverage (Tab.3) and the characteristics of the banks are 
summed up in table 4. 
 
Table 3. Geographical repartition of the sample  
 Banks in the list Banks outside the list 
North America 23 337 
Europe 15 46 
Asia 6 89 
Worldwide 44 499* 
Sources: Bloomberg and Bloomberg WDCI 
* Worldwide includes also Central and South American Countries, Israel and Jamaica. 
 
 
On the base of the geographical coverage and the interest in banks characteristics, our paper extends 
the strand of literature2 which connects banks performance to banks characteristics. Infact our main 
target is to try: 
 
1- to explain the probability to be a bank in the list published by Bloomberg;    
2- to catch the differences among the banks in the list, in term of write downs, by calculating the 
probability to be part of a certain partition. 
 
                                                 
1 This source is quite interesting and it offers a complete statistics on the write downs and credit losses by indi-
vidual banks from December 2007 ahead.  
2 Other strands explain the performance through country specific characteristics (Beck and Levine,2004; Le-
vine, 2004; Stulz and Williamson,2003), market structure (Berger,1995; Bergerand Humphrey,1997; Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002; Goddard et al., 2001; Molyneux et al.,1996) and macroeconomic conditions (Arpa et al., 2001; 
Bikker and Hu, 2002) 
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Table 4. Characteristics of the banks in the sample 
 Banks in the list 
 
Banks outside the list 
 Max. Min.  Mean Max. Min.  Mean 
ROA 3.4 -0.07  1.0 14.6 -3.2 1.34 
Number of  
employees 
 
313000 963 50098 91320 24 2563 
Total assets 
(Millions $) 
1703162 9956 473874 399507 104 10768 
Interbanking assets 
(Millions $) 
291090 0 39418 33215 0 825 
Tier 1 capital ratio 14.7 5.94  8.65 34.49 2.42 12.18 
Sources: Bloomberg and Bloomberg WDCI 
Notes: the values are the simple mean of the 2005-2006 quarterly data. 
 
Many could be the combinations of structural-variables to take under consideration, but our final 
choice, even guided by literature, is the following: 
1. internal determinants of performance:  
-return on assets (ROA),  
-tier 1 ratio,  
-interbanking assets 
2.  internal determinants of structure/size:  
-total assets,  
-number of employees, in order to catch organization difficulties connected to 
the dimension from a human capital prospective.  
All these data are taken from Bloomberg database. The values we use as regressors are the simple 
mean of the 2005-2006 quarterly data, the two years before the onset of the crisis. 
In this way the profitability, the leverage and the dimensional aspect of the bank are under analysis3. 
By considering the variables one by one, we observe that ROA represents the level of profitability 
(Golin, 2001) and it appears inversely related to proportion of loan loss provisions, by following 
Staikouras and Wood (2003), as well as that banks with greater levels of equity are relatively more 
profitable. 
Tier 1 ratio detects the ability to absorb losses4, the higher it is the better is the position of a bank. Exces-
sive leverage by banks is widely believed to have contributed to the global financial crisis (FSB 
2009; FSA 2009). Well-capitalized banks face lower costs of going bankrupt and of suffering losses 
by reducing their costs of funding. 
                                                 
3 All these information can be found on Bloomberg site. 
4 On the base of regulatory standards tier 1 capital ought be equal, on the base of Basel II, at least 4%  with 
Basel III instead the requirement increases to at least 6% (in particular the ratio will be set at 4.5% from 1 
January 2013, 5.5% from 1 January 2014 and 6% from 1 January 2015). 
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The size, represented by total assets, is an important aspect as highlighted in banks performance lit-
erature. It represents the level of potential economies5 to be used. These potential economies can as-
sume two forms: economies of scale, through the reduction of costs, and scope economies, through 
the access to markets with size limits access, through a better diversification of products and loans 
(Kosmidou et al., 2006, Barros et al., 2007). The second dimension of the size, the number of em-
ployees, has the role of taking into account the fact that the risk of loss can result even from inade-
quate or failed internal processes, people and systems, as expressed by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (BCBS). Chernobai et al. (2008) seem to confirm the relevance of the number of em-
ployees as one of the determinants of operational risk, by founding a significant and a concave rela-
tion between operational risk and the human factor. 
Our choice of variables seems also to follow the results of Chernobai et al. (2008), who, by studying 
159 U.S. financial institutions from 1980 to 2003, noticed that frequent losses can be connected to fi-
nancial constraints, expressed by higher leverage and equity volatility and lower market-to-book ratio, 
accompanied by high profitability and number of employees. 
By using the same variables, we try to investigate if they can help explain the difference in the losses 
suffered by banks during the crisis. 
 
1.1 Bank’s structure and performance as determinants of inter banks differences in losses 
We define the variable y, a dummy variable, coded “1” for banks in the list or “0”, for the opposite 
case, and xi with i=1-5 the set of explanatory variables given by structural and performance variables. 
The probability function of y conditional on all the regressors is specified by a probit model. To be in 
the list implies to suffer losses which is a latent variable y*generated by a regression 
y*= α+βXi+ε 
where α is a constant , xi represents the covariates and ε is a normally distributed random term. 
So  the probability of being in the list can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
Pr(y=1|xi)=Pr(εi<α+βXi)=Φ(α+βXi) 
 
                                                 
5 The evidence is not certain as a strand of literature is in favor of a positive connection of bank size and 
economies of scale in case of large banks (European Commission, 1997; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Al-
tunbas et al., 2001 ), while another strand supports the idea that just small banks are positively influenced by 
the size while large one are negative influenced (Vander Vennet, 1998; Pallage, 1991) 
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where Pr is for the probability while Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the stan-
dard normal distribution.  
Table 5 shows the first probit regression. As shown in the table, all the regressors are statistically sig-
nificant and with the expected signs. Infact a negative sign for tier1 ratio implies that augmenting the 
tier1 ratio reduces the probability of being included in the list while positive signs of ROA and total 
assets imply that the larger the return on capital and the total assets the higher the probability to be in 
the list. By looking at the marginal effects (Tab.5), we observe, at mean values of tier 1 ratio (11.8), 
ROA (1.23) and total assets (50037), that the probability to be in the list would have been equal to 
0.032. By repeating the analysis (Tab.5) doubling the values of ROA (2.5) and total assets (100000) 
and reducing  the tier 1 (5.9), the same probability becomes larger and equal to 0.68.  
 
Table 5. Probit Model on the full sample with three regressors 
 
 
 
We repeat then the study (Tab.6) by adding a new regressor, representative of the largeness or com-
plexity of the banks organizations: the number of employees.  
By considering the results of the estimation, we find that even this coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant and with the positive expected sign while the variable representative of the performance, ROA, 
Dependent variable: WDCI1. Pseudo R2: 0.6421 
Total number of banks: 459; number of WDCI banks: 41. 
LR chi2 = 177.42, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Regressors Coefficients Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.1958658 0.0714 -2.74 0.006 
ROA 0.4296135 0.2050 2.09 0.036 
Tot. Assets 0.0000118 1.71e-06 6.88 0.000 
Constant -0.6418107 0.6362 -1.01 0.313 
Marginal effect on regressors mean values: tier 1=11.8, ROA=1.23, tot assets=50037 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.0319 
 dy/dx Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.0140404 0.00365 -3.85 0.000 
ROA 0.0307963 0.0138 2.23 0.026 
Tot assets 8.44e-07 0.0000 2.26 0.024 
Marginal effect for the following values for regressors: Tier 1= 5.9, ROA=2.5, Tot as-
sets=100000  
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.6752 
Tier 1 -0.0704698 0.01597 -4.41 0.000 
ROA 0.1545691 0.04932 3.13 0.002 
Tot assets 4.24e-06 0.00000 4.00 0.000 
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loses the significance. Again it emerges (Tab.6) that by augmenting the performance and enlarging 
the dimension of the structure the probability of losses increases  from 0.023 to 0.973.  
This result confirms what previously found: large banks in terms of number of employees and total 
assets, with a pressure in term of profitability, are the most exposed to losses. 
 
Table 6. Probit model on the full sample with four regressors 
Dependent variable: WDCI1. Pseudo R2: 0.6566  
Total number of banks: 432; number of WDCI banks: 39 
LR chi2 = 172, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Regressors Coefficients Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.227 0.078 -2.93 0.003 
ROA 0.390 0.261 1.49 0.135 
Tot. Assets 6.87e-06 2.52e-06 2.73 0.006 
Num.employ. 0.0000392 0.000 2.57 0.010 
Constant -0.349 0.680 -0.51 0.608 
Marginal effect on regressors mean values: Tier 1=11.8, ROA=1.21, Tot assets=50697, 
Num employ=6318 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.0236 
 dy/dx Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.013 0.004 -3.28 0.001 
ROA 0.022 0.014 1.53 0.126 
Total assets 3.82e-07 0.000 1.43 0.153 
Num.employ. 2.18e-06 0.000 1.84 0.066 
Marginal effect for the following values for regressors: Tier 1= 5.9, ROA=2.5, Tot as-
sets=100000 and  Num employ.=50000. 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.9732 
Tier 1 -0.014 0.017 -0.80 0.422 
ROA 0.024 0.031 0.78 0.434 
Tot. assets 4.25e-07 0.000 0.61 0.544 
Num.employ. 2.42e-06 0.000 0.83 0.408 
 
 
This result also confirms the prescription of Basel 3 agreement which points special attention to large 
institutions. 
 
1.2 Bank’s structure and performance as determinants of intra banks differences in losses 
If the previous analysis is a guide in understanding why during the same phenomenon there appears a 
different reaction among banks, by looking at the characteristics of the banks in the list, it becomes 
necessary to discover which are the causes of a so big heterogeneity in losses. We repeat then the 
analysis by using this new sample, 44 banks in the list, partitioned, on the base of the severity of loss, 
through a new dummy which assumes value “1” or “0”, if the losses are higher or lower than 9 mil-
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lion6 respectively. We try to understand here the factors discriminating the intensity of losses. A new 
probit model is then estimated by using the same regressors we used to explain the inclusion in the list. 
In this case our target is then to study the effect of the above mentioned regressors over the probabil-
ity of loss over 9 million. 
Only one regressor (Tab.7), total assets, is now statistically significant and with the expected sign. A 
confirmation of the role of performance and structure is found even for losses larger than 9 million. 
Infact by increasing the dimension and the level of performance, with the tier1 ratio at the Basel III 
level, the probability increases sensibly, becoming nearly 0.94. 
 
Table 7. Probability on WDCI banks list with over 9 millions losses – 1 
Dependent variable: WDCI2. Pseudo R2: 0.2533 
WDCI banks: 41  
LR chi2 = 14.34, Prob > chi2 = 0.0025  
Regressors Coefficient Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.069 0.147 -0.47 0.641 
ROA 0.539 0.432 1.25 0.212 
Tot. Assets 1.93e-06 6.03e-07 3.21 0.001 
Constant -0.893 1.185 -0.75 0.451 
Marginal effect on regressors mean values : Tier 1=8.6, Roa=1.06, Tot assets=453687 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.4825 
 dy/dx Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
Tier 1 -0.027 0.059 -0.47 0.641 
Roa 0.215 0.172 1.25 0.213 
Total assets 7.71e-07 0.000 3.19 0.001 
Marginal effect on the following values: Tier 1= 5.9, Roa=2.5, Tot assets=500000 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.9407 
Tier 1 -0.016 0.025 -0.64 0.519 
Roa 0.128 0.054 2.40 0.017 
Tot. Assets 4.60e-07 0.000 1.11 0.269 
 
 
We repeat again the study (Tab.8) by substituting the tier 1 ratio with the interbanking assets7, to see 
if the exposition in term of the connections with other banks can be a possible explanation for large 
losses. Even this new factor is significant  and with a positive expected sign. This means that even the 
position in the interbanking market had a negative effect, creating instability which matured in losses. 
In this case even the coefficient of the ROA is slightly significant. In part this would confirm the em-
pirical evidence of Furfine (2001) who found that the risk, expressed by the interest paid on federal 
                                                 
6 This partition divides the list in nearly two half: 22 are the banks with a loss over 9 million while 23 show a 
loss lower than 9 million. 
7 The literature is not certain on the  evaluation of interbanking assets infact ,  while Allen and Gale (2000) and 
Freixas et al.(2000) considers interbanking assets as a source of contagion, Rochet and Tirole (1996) and 
Calomiris, (1998) consider it a source for prudence, as banks are better in evaluating other banks status and 
so this lending favors less risky behavior.  
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fund loans, connected to a borrower bank is dependent on the profitability and capital ratio. The mar-
ginal analysis, on mean values, shows a probability of a loss over 9 million equal to 0.65. 
At the end a new identikit can be now offered for losses over 9 millions: large banks exposed in the 
interbanking market with a need for high profitability are exposed to highly severe losses. 
 
Table 8. Probability on WDCI banks list with over 9 millions losses – 2 
Dependent variable: WDCI2. Pseudo R2: 0.3279 
WDCI banks: 39. 
LR chi2 = 17.52, Prob > chi2 = 0.0006  
Regressori Coefficient Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
ROA 0.815 0.446 1.83 0.068 
Total assets 1.44e-06 7.74e-07 1.86 0.063 
interbanking  
assets 
0.0000305 0.000 2.08 0.038 
Constant -2.256 0.81317 -2.77 0.006 
Marginal effect on regressors mean values : Roa=1.03, Tot assets=405942, Interb. as-
sets=39418 
y = Pr (WDCI1 = 1) = 0.6462 
 dy/dx Standard error Z Prob. > |Z| 
ROA 0.3030741 0.15618 1.94 0.052 
Tot. Assets 5.34e-07 0.00000 1.86 0.063 
Interb. 
Assets 
0.0000113 0.00000 2.67 0.007 
 
 
2. Conclusions 
In this study we try to explain the probability of banks to suffer severe or highly severe losses, repre-
sented by the inclusion in the WDCI list, proposed by Bloomberg, by their structure and performance. 
These aspects are represented by 4 variables: ROA, tier1 ratio, number of employees and total assets. 
Then, by considering the heterogeneity among the banks of the list, an explanation of the probability 
of the type of losses (severe or highly severe) is offered by using the previous variables with the addi-
tion of a new variable: the interbanking assets.  
The results of the probit models give us two “identikits” of banks: the first identifies the characteris-
tics of banks included in the WDCI list (suffering severe or highly sever losses) and the second identi-
fies the banks with highly severe losses. 
In both cases the dimension of the bank is crucial: a large bank, in terms of number of employees and 
total assets, with a strong pressure for profitability is vulnerable to losses, a larger bank with a strong 
pressure for profitability and exposed in the interbanking sector may suffer highly severe losses.  
These results confirm the direction of the new rules inspired by the Basel 3 agreement and by the Fi-
nancial Stability Board, which seem generally in favor of a solid patrimonial structure with an addic-
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tion of capitalization for large banks, just to reduce the risk of losses. This interest in the large dimen-
sion is absolutely relevant as large banks, in case of fragility and of negative shocks, through their in-
ter-connections, can start a domino effect which can propagate affecting the entire financial system.  
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